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Some Definitions
• What is an exchange rate regime?
– It is the system a country’s monetary authority uses to
determine its exchange rate against other currencies
– Freely Floating System: supply and demand in the foreign
exchange market determines the price of our currency, the
USD, against say, the British Pound
– Opposite extreme – Fixed Exchange Rate System: the
Central Bank determines what the price of your currency
will be in terms of another currency. E.g. The Hong Kong
dollar is pegged to the USD.
– Range of arrangements in between

Range of Exchange Rate Regimes

• Source: Policonomics

Polity Regimes
• The system under which the governing
authority or institution of an independent
country is established and operates
• Range: fully institutionalized autocracies to
fully institutionalized democracies with mixed
or incoherent authority regimes in between
(anocracies)

Sub-Saharan Africa (Source: Researchgate)

• Source: Researchgate

Research Issue
• Traditionally, in advanced economies, economic
considerations drive the exchange rate regime choice
• Balance of power between economic agents who stand
to gain from flexible exchange rates versus agents with
a strong preference for stability of exchange rates
• However, in frontier and transition economies, political
factors play a significant role in the exchange rate
regime choice determination
• This project examines the linkages between varying
degrees of democratization and exchange rate regimes
in sub-Saharan Africa
• Why Africa? Why sub-Saharan Africa?

The African Experience
• 18 of the 20 slowest growing countries in the world
during 1960-2000 happen to be in Africa
• 38 countries in Africa recorded a mean growth rate of
0.6 percent per year over the same period (Barro &
Sala-i-Martin, 2004)
• Consistent problems with obsolete infrastructure,
corruption, widespread poverty and malnutrition,
exacerbated with frequent epidemics of diseases such as
malaria, Ebola
• Political leaders have an incentive to stay in office for a
protracted period
• Selects economic policies that enhance (re)electability
and minimizes likelihood of a military takeover

Factors Behind African Growth Puzzle
• Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Barr & Oduro, 2002, Easterly &
Levine, 1997)
• Corruption (Vicente, 2010)
• Environmental factors such as natural resources (Sachs &
Warner, 2001)
• History of slavery (Nunn, 2008)
– Using data from shipping records, finds negative relationship
between the number of slaves exported from each country and
current economic performance

• Link between precolonial statehood and current regional African
development (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015)
• Tse Tse Fly-suitable areas of Africa were less likely to be politically
centralized historically in the precolonial era (Aslan, 2015)
• Bottomline: heterogeneity of today’s African growth experience has
multiple sources

Broader Context and Motivation
• Economic growth: objective for both advanced
countries (stable growth rate) and emerging
countries (high growth rate)
• Issue of concern for domestic governments,
global institutions such as World Bank, IMF,
BIS, OECD, etc., academics, private investor
groups, public-private partnerships, policymakers

Context & Motivation (contd.)
• Complex set of determinants of economic growth
identified by the literature across disciplines of
economics and finance, development economics,
political science and law, history, entrepreneurship
• From economics and finance:
– real income, savings rate, financial intermediary
development: Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, (1996), Levine &
Zervos, (1998)
– Trade openness, exchange rate regimes, foreign direct
investment: Bortolotti & Milella, (2006)
– stock market performance, liquidity, size, turnover: Ben
Naceur, Ghazouani, & Omran, (2007)

Context & Motivation (contd.)
• Inter-disciplinary literature suggests a wide range of
factors:

– democracy: Boubakri & Hamza, (2007), Biswas and Ofori,
(2015)
– inequality, legal environment, sustained program of
privatization: Roe and Siegel, (2011),
– political risk (corruption, assurance of property rights): Vicente,
(2010), Sachs & Warner, (2001), Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou (2015),
– environmental factors (natural resources), colonial legacies
(slave exports): Nunn (2008)
– legal origins, ethno-linguistic fractionalization: Yang, (2011), Barr
& Oduro, (2002), Easterly & Levine, (1997)
– proximity to the equator (Tsetse fly): Aslan (2015)

Narrower Context
• Exchange Rate Regime choice has also emerged
as one of the influencers of economic growth
– though not unequivocally (Jensen, 2003)
– direction of causality could also be reversed

• So, this study focuses on one narrow aspect of
this bigger issue: the nature of the influence of
democratization on exchange rate regime choice
• Ultimate objective of discipline: identify drivers of
economic growth in poorest nations

Related Literature
• Significant differences between drivers of the
exchange rate regime choice between
developed and less developed countries or
LDCs (Roland, 2002, Markiewicz, 2006,
Berdiev, Kim and Chang, 2012)
• Advanced economies’ primary considerations:
unemployment, inflation, output growth
• LDCs and new democracies: Electoral
considerations dominate

Related Literature (contd.)
• Electoral democracy brings with it a minimum
legal infrastructure protecting property and
investor rights and contract enforcements
• Political system under a democracy introduces
– a system of checks and balances (Siegel et al, 2004)
– a certain openness and competitiveness (Haber et
al., 2007) and
– constrains government ownership of financial
institutions, including banks (La Porta et al., 1998,
1999)

Related Literature (contd.)
• However, there could be some inherent
inhibiting factors, especially with nascent
democracies
– uncertainty about the political state
– weak economic environment
– inadequate financial infrastructure
– Inequality - benefits of democratization accruing
only to a few segments of society while leaving
ethnic minorities unaffected

Democracy and Exchange Rate Regime
Choice: The Trade-offs
• Fixed Exchange Rates – domestic currency pegged to a more
disciplined foreign currency
– Pros
• Exchange rate stability
• Lower, stable inflation
• Commitment to peg implies credibility of leadership

– Cons
• Government loses monetary policy authority
– Unable to use monetary policy tools such as interest rate changes to
combat recession or unemployment

Democracy and Exchange Rate Regime
Choice: The Trade-offs (contd.)
• Floating Exchange Rates – FX markets determine exchange
rate
– Pro
• Monetary policy autonomy
– Government has leeway to deal with macroeconomic issues
– Cons
• Exchange rate volatility
• Possibility of high inflation
• Uncertainty and instability deters foreign investment

• In the end – an empirical issue

Hypothesis Development
• We test the following relationship:
The higher the degree of democracy, the greater the
likelihood of adopting a pegged exchange rate
regime

• We test three specific components of the
electoral process
– Openness of a country’s executive recruitment
– Electoral competition
– Separation of power in country’s political
economy

Data and Methodology
• Screen:
– Data availability

• Final sample: 49 countries; 2000 to 2016
• Data sources:
– World Development Indicators (2018)
– Polity IV
– Database of Political Institutions

Data & Methodology (contd).
• Model:
• 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡

– where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes the exchange rate regime of
country i at time t
– the vector Z is our key independent variable
representing the democracy index for country i at
time t
– X is a battery of control variables

• We use Ordered Logit Regression method

Model Specifications
• 3 key components of the electoral process
examined – sub-categories in Polity IV:
– Openness of a country’s executive recruitment
process (EXECRECRUIT)
• Closed = situation where leader of nation is a monarch
or chosen via hereditary succession
• Open = every politically active member of the
population can contest for the highest office

Model Specifications (contd.)
• Political competition (EXECCOMP)
– Possibility of 2 or more candidates or parties
contesting for the highest office
• 1 = little to no competition in the electoral process
• 3 = very competitive process

• Constraints on chief executive (EXECCONST)
– Separation of powers in a country’s political
system
• 1 = little or no constraints
• 7 = constraints on the chief executive; separation of
power

Findings and Implications
• Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries with
higher scores of democratization have a
greater likelihood of pegging their currency
(Table III in Appendix)
– Lower inflation is perceived as key to (re)electability

• SSA countries with greater electoral openness
are more likely to peg their currencies
– Closed electoral system African leaders prefer floating
their currencies – gives them monetary autonomy to print
money to enhance (re)electability (Table IV in Appendix)

Findings and Implications (contd.)
• SSA countries with greater electoral competition have a
greater preference for pegging their currency
– Curbing inflation and establishing their credibility in doing so for
(re) electability is achieved more easily with a fixed exchange
rate (Table V in Appendix)

• SSA countries with greater separation of powers (more
constraints on the chief executive) tend to prefer a
pegged currency
– Central banks in countries with greater separation of power are
more independent so leaders do not derive any benefit from
floating their currencies (Table VI in Appendix)

• SSA countries with military (authoritarian) leaders have
no relationship with the exchange rate regime choice
– Military ruler has no re-election concerns; actions are
independent of exchange rate regime choice (Table VII)

Summary and Conclusions
• Using ordered logit regression analysis on 49 sub-Saharan
African countries during the period 2000 to 2016, we examine
the role of political factors in influencing the choice of the
exchange rate regime
• We find supporting evidence that as the degree of
democratization increases, there is a stronger preference for
fixed exchange rates
• Next steps:
– Distinguish between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes
– Test for Threshold effect – minimum threshold level of trade with
single trading partner (former colonial power or powerful neighbor)
dominate political considerations
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